Increases in the money supply might lower interest rates, but only a bit, and lower interest rates might stimulate investment spending, but only a bit. Any correlation between money and economic activity reflected mainly a causal path from income to money or a common third factor that affected both. AMH changed the way most economists thought about monetary policy. What came to be called the Neo-Keynesian consensus put considerable weight on monetary policy and owed a great deal to AMH.
The key propositions of the modern quantity theory were that: based on the interaction between a stable long run demand for money and an independently determined money supply, a change in the rate of growth in the money supply would produce a corresponding but lagged change in the growth of nominal income. In the short-run changes in money would produce changes in real output; in the long run changes in money would be fully reflected in changes in the price level. In modern terms, monetary changes would temporarily impact real output reflecting nominal rigidities but ultimately the growth of real output is independent of monetary forces and monetary neutrality would prevail.
AMH was designed to provide long-run historical evidence for the modern quantity theory (with the underlying statistics presented in Monetary Statistics), Money and Business
Cycles was to provide short-run cycle evidence, and Monetary Trends was to provide long-run econometric evidence. Of all these efforts only AMH and Monetary Statistics have survived the test of time.
I. The Narrative Approach
what has come to be called "the narrative approach" -in his classic paper "The Methodology of Positive Economics (1953) ." To illustrate the importance of natural experiments Friedman (1953, 11) turned to monetary history: "Occasionally, experience casts up evidence that is about as direct, dramatic, and convincing as any that could be provided by controlled experiments. Perhaps the most obviously important example is the evidence from inflations on the hypothesis that a substantial increase in the quantity of money within a relatively short period is accompanied by a substantial increase in prices. Here the evidence is dramatic, and the chain of reasoning required to interpret it is relatively short. Yet, despite numerous instances of substantial rises in prices, their essentially one-to-one correspondence with substantial rises in the stock of money, and the wide variation in other circumstances that might appear to be relevant, each new experience of inflation brings forth vigorous contentions, and not only by the lay public, that the rise in the stock of money is either an incidental effect of a rise in prices produced by other factors or a purely fortuitous and unnecessary concomitant of the price rise."
The phrase "wide variation in other circumstances that might appear to be relevant" deserves attention. In any one inflationary episode there will be non-monetary forces at work that some observers will claim caused the inflation: wartime mobilization, government deficits, union militancy, shocks to the supply of crucial raw materials, and so on. The economist needs to examine those factors, and see how they varied across historical episodes. If the generalization that money causes inflation holds across episodes, even as other factors vary, there is compelling evidence for it. The quotation also illustrates another hallmark of Friedman's methodology: the importance of a "short chain of reasoning." The goal of science is to explain much with little;
Occam's razor must be wielded ruthlessly. Thus, Friedman's essay anticipates the main mission of AMH: to show that in a long series of examples, stretching across very different monetary regimes, the relationships between money, prices, and output suggested by basic economic theory continue to hold.
An overview of some of the evidence that is examined in AMH can be seen in Figure 1 which compares the rate of change of money per unit of output and the rate of change of prices in 10 monetary regimes stretching from the end of the Civil War to 2012. During the greenback era from the end of the Civil War until 1879 the United States was on a floating exchange rate.
The growth of high powered money was determined internally. And the rate was low because the federal government followed a policy of letting the economy "grow up to the currency." The resulting deflation was necessary so that the United States could rejoin the gold standard at the prewar parity. Once the United States returned to gold, the sources of the increase in the stock of money were different. Under the gold standard the stock of high-powered money was the product of net international transactions and domestic mining. From 1879 until 1896 the money supply grew relatively slowly producing a mild deflation. Then the supply of gold increased due to discoveries in a number of countries, most importantly South Africa, and the development of the new cyanide process for extracting gold from ore, a crucial development for the South African industry: clearly exogenous shocks that the narrative approach was able to identify. The acceleration in the growth rate of money was not dramatic, but was sufficient to turn a secular decline in prices into a secular advance. This was a persuasive natural experiment: an increase in the stock of money that was unplanned by any government authority, but rather the result of exogenous events, had produced the consequences predicted by the quantity theory of money.
With the founding of the Fed in 1913, the monetary system changed again. Now, the amount of high-powered money was controlled by the Fed. Gold flows could affect the stock, but the Fed had considerable power to neutralize those flows. During World War I, the Fed became subservient to the Treasury, buying debt in order to keep nominal interest rates low and stable. The same was true in World War II, and the two wars together became further grist for the mill (Friedman 1952; AMH 1963b, 567-71) . As shown in Figure 1 , inflation proceeded at a somewhat slower pace in World War II than in World War I. Yet World War II was by many measures the more intense conflict: the period of active engagement was longer, the casualty rate was higher, and federal deficits were larger relative to GDP. The difference between the wars was that money per unit of output grew more slowly in World War II than in World War I for a variety of reasons related to the behavior patterns with respect to money of the banks and the public. In the last period examined in AMH, which we have designated Postwar in figure 1, the United States returned to a regime of slow growth in money per unit of output and inflation.
We have added three regimes that were not covered in AMH: the Great Inflation , the Great Moderation , and the Great Recession AMH discusses many natural experiments that occurred over shorter intervals than a "monetary regime." The sharp increases in the Fed's discount rate in 1920, when the Fed tried to end inflation; in 1928, when the Fed tried to discourage stock market speculation; and in 1931, when the Fed jacked up the discount rate to protect its gold reserves while ignoring a banking panic; in each case undermining the economy, are important examples. Another example that has garnered considerable attention in recent years was the decision by the Fed to double required reserves in a series of steps in 1936-37 in order, the Fed believed, to lock up potentially inflationary excess reserves (AMH 1963b, 520-7) . AMH (1963b, 544) concluded that the decline in the stock of money that resulted from this decision -and the "equally important" Treasury gold-sterilization program -"significantly intensified the severity of the decline [in economic activity] and also probably caused it to occur earlier than otherwise." Of course, it was not a laboratory experiment. For one thing, fiscal policy was also changing. Taxes increased, partly because the new Social Security Tax came on line; and spending declined, mainly because the one-time veteran's bonus ran its course. As a result, the budget deficit fell from 4.4 billion in 1936 to 1.2 billion in 1938 (Carter et al 2006, series Ea586) . But the episode was, nevertheless, another piece of evidence consistent with the view that money matters.
AMH is usually remembered today because of chapter 7, The Great Contraction, in which the authors carefully show how the Fed, which was designed to prevent a repeat of the banking panics of the National Banking era, failed to prevent four major banking panics from producing a monetary collapse leading to the worst recession in U.S. history. Some readers of chapter 7 have been frustrated by what seemed to them to be an attempt by AMH to assume the relationship between monetary events and the severity of the Depression rather than to prove it. But a causal relationship between money and income cannot be established in one chapter about one period in monetary history. One set of natural experiments, however suggestive, cannot prove that money matters; the proof comes from the weight of all the evidence. That evidence includes some experiments that fell within the period 1929-1939, but many more that fell outside it.
AMH, we should emphasize, did not espouse a monocausal explanation of the business cycle. In the course of their narrative FS drew attention to many non-monetary factors that they believed had influenced the business cycle, although they did not investigate them systematically across time. For example, FS (1963b, 307) thought that the 1929 stock market crash had "made the decline in income sharper than it otherwise would have been." And in explaining the incompleteness of the recovery in the 1930s, FS turned to a non-monetary explanation that has reemerged recently to explain the slow recovery from the current recession (Ohanian and Taylor 2012) . Here they endorsed the view of Kenneth D. Roose (1954) that "Business confidence," and as a result business investment, had been weakened by increased regulation, the expansion of government activities into areas traditionally reserved for private enterprise, measures that threatened the sanctity of private property, Roosevelt's attack on the "economic royalists," and so on (FS 1963b, 495-96) .
A wave of research was triggered by Peter Temin's (1976) The key finding of AMH, to sum up, is that the money-income relationship is invariant to changing monetary arrangements and banking structures. Although FS identify an influence from income to money over the business cycle, they argue that the main influence both cyclically and secularly runs from money to nominal income. Of special importance is the evidence they give on monetary disturbances: sharp declines in output were precipitated by sharp reductions in money supply, while episodes of sustained inflation were invariably produced by the growth of money in excess of the growth of real income. In both types of disturbances, the historical record provides instances where inappropriate actions by the monetary authorities were to blame. Thus the Great Contraction of 1929-33 was a consequence of an unprecedented collapse in the stock of money that the Fed could have prevented, while episodes of inflation during the World Wars were products of wartime issues of fiat money.
The narrative approach of AMH took time to gain traction. In his admiring, although also critical review of AMH, James Tobin (1965) conceded that FS had "identified some convincing examples of monetary changes that were clearly independent of contemporary or immediately preceding economic events," and he was "willing to agree that these monetary events contributed in important degree to the economic events which followed." But in later work Tobin (1970) focused on timing evidence as the key data for establishing a causal relationship between money and income. In his reply to Tobin Friedman (1970, 320) pointed to the weight that he and Mrs.
Schwartz placed on historical evidence. He conceded that "It may be that in the early years of my work on money, I regarded the lead of money at peaks and troughs as decisive evidence of the independent influence of money." But he went on to argue that for at least a decade prior to 1970 he was fully aware of the limitations of timing evidence, and rather was examining such evidence to determine the leads and lags that could be used to formulate policies and make predictions (Friedman 1970, 322) . A short and consistent lag would point to leaving monetary policy to the discretion of the Fed; the long and variable lag that FS found pointed toward a monetary rule.
The narrative approach pioneered by AMH to isolate independent sources of monetary change was picked up by later macroeconomists as a way to solve the identification problem in macroeconomic models. In his remarks on Milton Friedman's ninetieth birthday Ben Bernanke (2002b) explained how FS use natural experiments to solve the identification problem in monetary economics, and how after reading AMH as a graduate student at M.I.T. he became hooked on monetary economics and economic history. Romer and Romer (1989) , however, are critical of FS for not clearly demarcating their identification strategy and for picking dates which may have been tainted by endogenous feedback from the real economy. They extend the FS strategy to the Post World War II era using FOMC minutes to identify episodes of deliberate Fed tightening to offset inflation. Miron (1994) and Lucas (1994) Rules versus Discretion. Friedman (1959) , following a long Chicago tradition, made the case for following his constant money growth rate rule rather than central bank discretion. The experience of the Great Contraction described in AMH, as well as many other episodes where
Fed stabilization policy backfired, provides historical evidence for his case. Warburton (1966) 3 FS did not explicitly discuss unconventional monetary policy action. Friedman's (1969) discussion of a helicopter dropping money has been used to justify such actions (Bernanke 2002a) .
and later Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz (1995) and McCallum (1990) Friedman's case against the gold standard is also not dealt with directly in AMH but was in A Program for Monetary Stability (1959) and in his essay on "Real Versus Pseudo Gold Standards" (1961) .The issue of free banking versus central banking is also not explicitly discussed by FS in AMH but appeared in their 1986 JME article. Friedman's case against Keynesian economics, which is largely based on the evidence in AMH, is also developed later in his work with David Meiselman (1965) and in his debate with his critics in Gordon (1974) . Thus, in many respects AMH, and subsequent work by FS based on AMH, are like the Bible. If you look hard enough you can find insightful references to most of the salient issues in modern macroeconomics.
III. Conclusion
AMH is a classic whose reputation has grown with age. It was written as part of a research program which involved several other major books and journal articles. All of the other publications have been virtually forgotten. Why has AMH (and its companion Monetary Statistics) endured? We think the answer is that AMH is based on narrative and not an explicit theory or a model. It was designed to provide evidence for the modern quantity theory of money. have also influenced modern central bankers. As Lucas (1994, 8) said "If I ever go to Washington for some other reason than viewing cherry blossoms, I will pack my copy of AMH and leave the rest of my library-well most of it-at home". In the recent crisis it seems that many of our policy makers followed his advice but not fully.
